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DEATH: A PHILOSOPHICAL
PERSPECTIVE ON THE LEGAL DEFINITIONS
WILLIAM C. CHARRON*
Language cannot be made precise enough to eliminate dispute about
every possible application of a given term. Unforeseen circumstances
may reveal vagueness in any term. Furthermore, the human needs and
interests directing creation of the distinctions fixed by language are not
static. Consequently, categorial adjustments and definitional changes
are often required.
Developments in medical technology, most notably in organ trans-
plantation and artificial life-support, have provoked a reconsideration
of the time-honored legal definition of death. Traditionally defined as
the total and permanent arrest of all vital functions, including cardiac
and respiratory functions,' the term "death" has proved to be unaccepta-
bly vague. For example, a distinction can now be made between
spontaneous and artificially maintained life functions. Furthermore,
the practice of pronouncing death only in the event of both cardiac and
respiratory failure has proved inhibiting and burdensome to the procure-
ment of useful organs for transplantation; transplant surgeons operating
in jurisdictions that have not adopted appropriate legal definitional
adjustments risk civil suit if they select donors whose cardiac function
has not totally failed.2
* Associate Professor of Philosophy, St. Louis University. A.B., 1959, St. Bene-
dict's College; A.M., 1961, University of Detroit; Ph.D., 1966, Marquette University.
1. See, e.g., Thomas v. Anderson, 96 Cal. App. 2d 371, 215 P.2d 478 (1950) (af-
firming the trial court's determination of which of two persons died first). In Thomas,
the appellate court stated: "'death is the cessation of life; the ceasing to exist; defined
by physicians as a total stoppage of the circulation of the blood, and a cessation of the
animal and vital functions consequent thereon, such as respiration, pulsation, etc.'" Id.
at 376, 215 P.2d at 481-82, quoting BLACK'S LAW DICIONARY 488 (3d ed. 1933).
See also Smith v. Smith, 229 Ark. 579, 587, 317 S.W.2d 275, 279 (1958); In re Estate
of Schmidt, 261 Cal. App. 2d 262, 273, 67 Cal. Rptr. 847, 854 (1968); Schmitt v. Pierce,
344 S.W.2d 120, 133 (Mo. 1961) (use of the traditional definition of death set forth
in BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY).
For a compilation of various formulations of the traditional notion of death used by
the courts, see Halley & Harvey, Medical vs Legal Definitions of Death, 204 J.A.M.A.
423, 424 (1968).
2. For example, in Tucker's Adm'r v. Lower, No. 2831 (Richmond, Va., Ct. L.
& Eq., May 25, 1972), a wrongful death action was brought against a heart transplant
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Unfortunately, the effort to meet these semantical and practical diffi-
culties in defining death through legislation and judicial decision
might well prove to be short-sighted. The new brain death definitions
of human death can impose needless economic and emotional burdens
on families, physicians, and hospitals that care for permanently and
irreversibly comatose bodies. Because certain lower brain centers that
support respiration have not ceased to function, such persons are not
dead under either the traditional or the new total brain death definition
of death.5
surgeon by the donor's brother. The jury found for the surgeon after the judge in-
structed that it had the option of using complete and irreversible loss of all brain func-
tions as one of several tests for determining the time of death. For details and analysis
of the trial, see Converse, But When Did He Die?: Tucker v. Lower and the Brain
Death Concept, 12 SAN DEGo L. REv. 424 (1975); Mosher, When Does Life End?, The
National Observer, June 3, 1972, at 1, col. 1; N.Y. Times, May 24, 1972, at 6, col. 1;
id., May 27, 1972, at 15, col. 5.
3. See ALAsKA STAT. § 09.65.120 (Supp. 1975); CALIF. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE
§§ 7180, 7181 (Deering 1975); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 77-202 (Supp. 1975); MD. ANN.
CODE art. 43, § 54F (Supp. 1975); Mich. Pub. Acts of 1975, No. 158 (July 23, 1975);
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 1-2-2.2 (Supp. 1975); OKLA. STAT. ANN. 63 § 1-301(g) (Supp.
1975); VA CODE ANN. § 32-364.3:1 (Supp. 1975); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 16-19-1(b)
(Supp. 1975).
4. In People v. Saldona, 121 Cal. Rptr. 243 (Ct. App. 1975), People v. Lyons,
No. 56072 (Oakland, Cal., Crim. Super. Ct, May 23, 1974), and State v. Brown, 8 Ore.
App. 72, 491 P.2d 1193 (1971), homicide cases, brain death was adopted as a definition
or criterion of human death. In New York City Health & Hosp. Corp. v. Sulsona, 81
Misc. 2d 1002, 367 N.Y.S.2d 686 (Sup. Ct. 1975), petitioner sought a declaratory judg-
ment on the meaning of "death" in New York's Uniform Anatomical Gifts Statute, N.Y.
PuB. HEALTH LAW §§ 4300 et seq., 4301, 4306 (McKinney 1971). The court held that
the statute, in accordance with accepted medical standards, equated brain death with
human death. See also Tucker's Adm'r v. Lower, No. 2831 (Richmond, Va., Ct. L. &
Eq., May 25, 1972) (complete and irreversible loss of all brain functions one option
in determining time of a wrongful death).
5. Much discussion surrounded the case of Karen Ann Quinlan, the twenty-one
year old victim of brain damage who was described by her neurologist, Dr. Robert J.
Morse, as in a "chronic vegetative state." Public attention was focused on the new
"brain death" definition of death which requires not only irreversible loss of all con-
sciousness but also the cessation of those vegetative functions supported by brain stem
activity. In his prayer to the court, Joseph T. Quinlan requested that his daughter,
Karen Ann Quinlan, be declared mentally incompetent and that he be granted letters
of guardianship with the express power to authorize the discontinuance of all extraor-
dinary means of sustaining his daughter's vital processes. It was recognized that Karen
was not dead under either the traditional or "brain death" definitions. Even if it could
have been shown that Karen was irreversibly incapable of any consciousness, she re-
tained some degree of spontaneous respiration. Because respiration is supported by the
functioning of the brain stem, she could not have been totally brain dead. In re Quin-
lan, 137 N.J. Super. 227, 348 A.2d 801 (Super. Ct. 1975), rev'd, 44 U.S.L.W. 2463 (NJ.
Sup. Ct. Mar. 31, 1976). For a compilation of the legal briefs, court proceedings andhttps://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1975/iss4/3
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Age-old confusions about the logical status of definitions and the
proper method of resolving disputes about them have plagued much of
the discussion and many of the decisions relating to the definition of
death. This Commentary attempts to shed some light on the logic
appropriate to arguments and decisions concerning definitions, and
especially the definition of death. It raises criticisms of the most recent
and most significant definitional proposals, enactments, and rulings.
Finally, the Commentary proposes for consideration a definition of
death that avoids the shortcomings of previous proposals.
The best definition of human death would not express a truth or be a
true statement about the nature of death: no definition proposed or
adopted can be defended on the ground that it is true, nor criticized on
the ground that it is false with respect to what death itself is. Nonethe-
less, the search for an acceptable, if not a true, definition of death
should not be abandoned. The medical profession, however, in
advance of legislation reflecting public opinion, should not be permitted
to employ new criteria of death that indicate the occurrence of phenom-
ena not covered by the traditional notion.
A publicly defensible definition can be developed if it is recognized
that any definition proposed or adopted, whether it reasserts, precises, or
radically alters the traditional notion of death or the new brain death
definitions, is an expression of choice. Although it has no truth-value,
the choice is defensible in relation to the semantic and ethical problems
that initiated its consideration and the other human interests and needs
affected by its legal adoption.
In light of semantic and ethical requirements developed from a
consideration of the problems and interests surrounding the definitional
debate, the Commentary evaluates the various definitions of death re-
cently set forth by state legislatures, courts, and professional organiza-
tions, all of which equate human death with a physiological state of one
kind or another. In turn, a definition of human death on a psychologi-
cal plane that identifies death with the permanent loss of all conscious-
ness is recommended for public acceptance. Accordingly, certain phys-
iological states, such as the functional disintegration of the brain (or of
the brain cortex alone), become empirically established indicators (di-
agnostic criteria) of the occurrence of human death in the psychological
sense.
decision in the Quinlan case, see IN THE MATr OF KAREN QurNLAN (1975) (Univer-
sity Publications of America, Inc.).
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I. DEFINITON IN GENERAL
Surrounding the current dispute about how death should -be defined
legally is a more general disagreement about the nature of the task at
hand and the logic appropriate to the argument. The proper order of
philosophical inquiry requires preliminarily a clarification of the type of
definition sought and the mode of argument proper for its defense.
According to one view, a definition must express a truth of some sort;
hence, any definition must be accepted as a knowledge-claim. This
approach to definitional dispute has very ancient roots; Socrates' search
for definitions was presented in Plato's dialogues as a search for true
statements. When Socrates rejected the definitional proposals of his
interlocutors, it was frequently on the ground that they were false.0
Aristotle also thought that in defining one should attempt to give a
correct account of the nature of the thing in question: a proper
definition formulates the essence or nature of a thing.7 Several partici-
pants in the current debate on the definition of death have adopted
comparable views. For example, Hans Jonas argues that there is a
dividing line between life and death which human fiat can neither fix
nor change. 8 Unfortunately, the precise location of that line is presently
unknown; with the advent of recent medical technology, determining the
status of certain patients may be impossible. Nonetheless, he argues, our
attempt to define death is still subject to the demands of truth: a
definition of death should not unwittingly include what may in truth be
part of the domain of life. Thus, nothing less than the maximum
definition of death will do-brain death plus heart death plus any other
indication that may be pertinent." Sheff Olinger, arguing for a "cere-
bral death" definition that would require only the irreversible loss of
function of that part of the brain necessary for awareness and conscious-
ness, claims that his definition is "true."'1 Leon Kass asks whether
determination of a definition of death is a "matter of the true, or a
matter of the useful or good?" Without deciding the issue, Kass
6. The most dramatic illustration of Socrates' search for true definitions is found
in the following dialogues of Plato: Euthyphro; Laches; Lysis; Symposium; and Repub-
lic.
7. An extended discussion of definition and essence is to be found in Aristotle's
Metaphysics, Book 7.
8. See Jonas, Philosophical Reflections on Experimentation with Human Subjects,
98 DAEDALUS 219, 244 (1969).
9. Id.
10. Olinger, Medical Death, 27 BAYLoR L. REV. 22 (1975) [hereinafter cited as
Olinger].
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1975/iss4/3
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criticizes any quick dismissal of the view that "death" need not express a
truth.1
Defining death should not be an attempt to formulate a true statement
of what death actually is; unresolvable controversy would arise if the
task were perceived as a search for the truth about death. Yet a
definition that is to be used for all legal purposes must be publicly
defensible. Necessarily, a definition should be viewed as a convention
of language, and a proposed definition of death as a preference about
the way the term should be used in legal contexts. It then becomes
possible to develop arguments that any rational person can accept in
support of one definition rather than another.
Perhaps this concept is best explained by an illustration. Assume
that an individual in response to a call for a definition of death, declares
that death is really permanent coma. Assume also that this person
intends by his declaration to express a necessary truth about the world
and not a mere tautology reflecting some convention of language. It is
not clear what public defense, if any, could be offered to meet a
challenge of his knowledge-claim.
First, appeals to insights into the essence of things have never re-
solved-and would not here resolve-anything; opponents can always
claim their own insights without fear of refutation. Furthermore, the
existence or reality of essences remains problematic after more than
2000 years of debate. Second, an appeal to empirical findings would
provide no support. Empirical findings would establish only the occur-
rence (or nonoccurrence) of death in particular cases and other logical-
ly non-necessary facts such as the conditions under which it occurs, and
its effects. Further, before the empirical order can be used to support a
claim about death, a decision must have been reached about what is to
be meant by "death." As William James stated: "Experience merely
as such doesn't come ticketed and labelled."'1 2 Empirical information is
developed in terms of the categories and distinctions that individuals
bring to their experiences. Finally, no appeal to purely a priori
reasoning would convincingly establish the truth of the claim. The
hypothetical claimant does not intend to advance a claim whose truth is
a deductive consequence of the meanings of the terms alone; in that
case, the claim would be true, independent of the nature of the world.
11. Kass, Death as an Event: A Commentary on Robert Morison, 173 ScmNCE
698, 700-01 (1971 ) [hereinafter cited as Kass].
12. W. JAMEs, PRAGmATsM 172 (1907).
Vol. 1975:979] 983
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In short, the claimant is without any recognized means of defending his
claim to a rational public.
If the definitional problem created by the new medical technology is
viewed as a matter of truth, an unfortunate consequence is likely to
occur: either the adoption of a perniciously dogmatic stand about the
truth of the definition or the adoption of various tests and criteria of
death without a definition of the underlying state they allegedly indicate.
The attempt to establish empirical tests and criteria for an undefined
state is deceptive: either a definition is actually, but covertly, operative
or the tests and criteria are totally arbitrary and in need of a determined
definition to set their limits.
These dangers can be averted and a publicly defensible definition
can be determined if a conventionalist viewpoint is substituted for the
position that an acceptable definition is a knowledge-claim. From the
conventionalist perspective, any definition, beyond a mere lexicographic
report about the use of the term by certain people at certain places and
times, is treated as the expression of a choice concerning a future
linguistic convention; it is not treated as a statement asserting what in
truth death itself is. Accordingly, various categorial distinctions are
treated as linguistically fixed human inventions and not as eternal
essences or naturally fixed kinds that the human mind can discover but
not create.13
The choice of a convention about the term "death" is, of course, not
arbitrary; its public defensibility relates to the problems that provoked
its consideration and the other human needs and interests that would be
affected by its legal adoption. Furthermore, once the definition of the
term "death" is adopted and the borderline between life and death is
chosen, the classification of particular cases becomes a purely factual
issue.
In stipulating meanings for legal terms such as "death," one confronts
demands unlike those confronting theoreticians such as pure mathemati-
cians, who must also establish meanings for the technical terms em-
ployed. Of course, both cases require that vicious multivocity14 as well
13. Cf. J. LOCKE, ESSAY CONCERNING HUMAN UNDERSTANDING, bk. 3, ch. 3, 11-
14 (5th rev. ed. 1706). Locke argued that the kinds, divisions, essences, and sorts of
things that men recognize are but "inventions" of the human mind; they are as men,
and not nature, make them. Choice is involved. That different people make different
choices is evident from disagreements over the boundaries of the various kinds of things
they distinguish.
14. "Multivocity" is a philosophical term signifying the situation when one term has
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1975/iss4/3
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as unnecessary vagueness be avoided. The pure mathematician, how-
ever, need not concern himself with the effects on human life and social
relationships resulting from wedding a certain meaning to a term that
already determines the conditions under which certain rights and duties
are protected and exacted. By contrast, enacting a legal definition of
the term "death" determines whether a given individual will continue to
receive specific immunities and protections and whether other individu-
als will be obligated or liable in certain ways. As a consequence,
defining "death" is an ethical choice and, as such, is subject to addition-
al demands.
The legal definition of the term "death" affects social arrangements
when death is pronounced and certified. Pronouncing and certifying
that someone is dead are unique kinds of legal performances, quite
different from the ordinary acts of merely describing or recounting the
fact that someone has died. More than being true or false statements of
an actual occurrence, the death pronouncement and certification as legal
acts are rightly or wrongly performed. Such factors as who made the
pronouncement and signed the certificate and in what manner and
under what circumstances these acts were performed are made relevant
by law. Properly performed, pronouncement and certification of death
trigger legal mechanisms that alter rights, duties, and responsibilities in
matters of ownership, transplantation, autopsy, burial, and even crimi-
nal and civil liability. The legally recognized definition of the term
"death" determines the range of application of these mechanisms of law.
Because of the connection between the semantics of the term "death"
and the effect of the properly performed pronouncement and certifica-
tion of death, the task of stipulating a definition of the term "death" for
legal purposes has an ethical force. 15
Since, in its ethical dimension, defining death requires reaching per-
vasive policy decisions, the public should be involved in determining the
definition. Contrary to the opinion of some authorities,'16 it is not the
prerogative of the medical profession to decide the matter. First, this
nonfactual question cannot be settled by empirical inquiry; hence, medi-
cal science, an empirical discipline concerned with the prediction, expla-
more than one meaning. A multivocity is "vicious" when it results in systematic confu-
sion in practical affairs.
15. Cf. C. STEVENSON, Emcs AND LANGUAGE 294-97 (1944).
16. See, e.g., Kennedy, The Kansas Statute on Death-An Appraisal, 285 NEw ENG.
1. MEnsciNE 946 (1971).
Vol. 1975:979]
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nation, and control of certain matters of fact, lacks the appropriate
competence. Furthermore, in a democratic and pluralistic society, basic
social arrangements and public ethics should not be determined by one
segment of the populace. For the same reason, the legal community
should not think of itself as the sole arbiter of the question. Both the
legal and medical professions have the right and the responsibility to
advance, as several voices among many, their recommendations con-
cerning the definition. Expeditious settlement of the problem is vital
for the sake of physicians who must know the extent of potential
criminal and civil liability and who are responsible for patient care, and
for the sake of incapacitated individuals themselves.
The medical profession must be relied upon to determine reliable
empirical tests for the type of incapacity eventually identified by law as
death. Appropriately, an Ad Hoc Committee of the Harvard Medical
School has recommended specific empirical indicators of irreversible loss
of brain function, which is one possible definition of death.17 In
17. Ad Hoc Committee of the Harvard Medical School to Examine the Definition
of Brain Death, A Definition of Irreversible Coma, 205 J.A.M.A. 337 (1968) [herein-
after cited as Harvard Committee].
As noted in the Harvard Committee report, the absence of circulation manifested by
the stoppage of blood in the retinal vessels or by the absence of cardiac activity, for
even a relatively brief period of time, is a safe sign of total brain death in patients not
subjected to artificial life-support measures. Anoxia causes total and permanent brain
damage in a few minutes. The patient maintained on a mechanical respirator presents
further problems; the brain may be permanently nonfunctional while the heart may con-
tinue to beat. The Harvard Committee points out four signs of total brain death when
a mechanical respirator has been employed:
1. Unreceptivity and Unresponsitivity [si].-There is total unawareness to
externally applied stimuli and inner need and complete unresponsiveness-our
definition of irreversible coma ...
2. No Movements or Breathing.-Observations covering a period of at
least one hour by physicians is [sic] adequate to satisfy the criteria of no spon-
taneous muscular movements or spontaneous respiration or response to stimuli
such as pain, touch, sound, or light. After the patient is on a mechanical
respirator, the total absence of spontaneous breathing may be established by
turning off the respirator for three minutes and observing whether there is any
effort on the part of the subject to breathe spontaneously ...
3. No Reflexes.-Irreversible coma with abolition of central nervous sys-
tem activity is evidenced in part by absence of elicitable reflexes. The pupil
will be fixed and dilated and will not respond to a direct source of bright light.
4. Flat Electroencephalogram.-Of great confirmatory value is the flat or
isoelectric EEG.... . At least ten full minutes of recording are desirable, but
twice that would be better.
Id. at 337-38.
Together the first three signs are sufficient for diagnosis. The fourth sign provides
"confirmatory" data that should be used when available, but it is not by itself sufficient
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1975/iss4/3
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addition, since medical professionals are recognized as expert witnesses
in the courts, they must continue to settle questions about the fact and
time of the occurrence of death in particular cases, using the criteria
recognized by the profession. Criteria to be used in diagnosing the
occurrence of a state cannot honestly be established in advance of some
definition of that state. Thus, in advance of a legal redefinition of
death, the medical profession's use of criteria that determine the occur-
rence of even a slightly different state than that covered by the tradition-
al definition would either involve a covert redefinition of death or be
absolutely arbitrary.
If the public is to participate in the defining of death, then it seems
clear from arguments similar to those advanced by Alexander Capron
and Leon Kass's that each state legislature should be engaged in formu-
lating a statutory definition of death. As Capron and Kass pointed out,
the encouragement of public discussion and the establishment of study
commissions to consult public views and issue resolutions, though help-
ful, are not alone adequate to establish policy. Reliance on the judicial
system is also not appropriate, for the courts are not equipped to hear
and heed public views. Without authority or machinery to hold public
hearings or survey public opinions, courts rely on medical professionals
as expert witnesses in matters involving death. Moreover, the courts act
not independently but only in response to matters brought to their
attention through litigation. On the other hand, the legislative branch
has the authority and machinery to involve the public in decision
making and to issue standards that reflect the will of the public.
II. REQUIREMENTS FOR AN ADEQUATE DEFINITION OF DEATH
As has been argued, the definition sought has no truth-value. None-
theless, it must meet a number of requirements derived from semantic
problems of vagueness and ambiguity and from practical and ethical
problems connected with determining certain basic rights and duties. To
be acceptable a definition of death must meet the following require-
mentg.
A. Designation of a Publicly Verifiable State
The definition must designate some status that can be determined
or necessary. All of the signs must be evidenced with no change in 24 hours after being
established.
18. Capron & Kass, A Statutory Definition of Standards for Determining Human
Death: An Appraisal and a Proposal, 121 U. PA. L. REy. 87, 95-101 (1972).
Vol. 1975:979] 987
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publicly and with a high degree of certainty. Because the irreversibility
or permanence of a condition is not directly observable, the use of that
element must be connected with some other phenomenon that is itself
directly and publicly observable and that is a reliable indicator from
which pertinent inferences can be drawn about the occurrence of death.
To be a reliable indicator or criterion of death, a phenomenon must
have been shown to have a regular and invariable connection with the
occurrence of death. A single failure of an accepted criterion should
provoke reexamination. For example, the complete recovery of a boy
maintained by a respirator over a two-week period after displaying a
"flat" EEG (isoelectric electroencephalogram), loss of reflexes and
responsiveness to environment, fall in arterial blood pressure, and loss of
spontaneous respiration should raise serious questions about the adequa-
cy of these phenomena as indicators of death."9 The demand for
reliability might require that a criterion of death be composed of a set of
factors; for instance, a complex of neurological and behavioral indica-
tors might be used. New findings and technological developments
should lead to refinements in accepted criteria and to the addition of
other criteria. Thus, statutes should not enumerate the criteria of death;
only the definition should be so determined. Once the legislature
establishes a definition, the medical profession can determine empirical-
ly the directly observable phenomena that are reliable indicators of the
occurrence of death as defined.
To be directly and publicly determinable, any criterion of death must
be a physical manifestation such as the absence of heartbeat, respiration,
reflexes and other muscular movements, or an isoelectric EEG. On the
other hand, the definition itself might well designate the loss of a
psychological capacity, as, for example, the permanent loss of the capac-
ity for consciousness. A definition indicating the permanent loss of a
psychological capacity would be acceptable insofar as it related in a
regular way to certain physical states observable by a physician.
Because many of the definitions of death embodied in religious
doctrines and the systems of metaphysical philosophers do not signify a
publicly verifiable condition, they could not be reasserted as a legal
definition of death. For example, death as the separation of soul and
body, a definition found in many religious doctrines and in Platonic
philosophies, is inadequate. The occurrence of death in this sense
19. See Wecht & Aranson, Medical-Legal Ramifications of Human Tissue Trans.
plantation, 18 DE PAUL L. REv. 488, 491 (1969).
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1975/iss4/3
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cannot be confirmed, for there is no public evidence of the existence of a
soul to be so separated.
B. Avoidance of Vagueness
To be adequate, a stipulation must avoid indeterminacy of applica-
tion in particular cases when there is knowledge of all pertinent facts of
the case. It would be impractical, however, to require that a stipulation
guard against vagueness in every imaginable situation; not only would
the definition be complicated with details for situations having little
likelihood of occurring, the definition would also be all but impossible
to formulate since the range of such situations is indefinite. As new and
unforeseeable circumstances emerge, the task of remedying any newly
revealed vagueness with additional precision will have to be continued.
Novelties capable of upsetting customary nomenclatures can never be
precluded.
C. Avoidance of a Vicious Multivocity
In the effort to correct the vagueness of the traditional definition of
death, a "vicious multivocity" must not be introduced. If the device of
legislating "alternative definitions" were employed, one of which reas-
serted the traditional sense of the term, and the other of which indicated
the kinds of cases that had been in a grey area (such as permanently
comatose patients maintained on artificial support systems), the system
would have to include safeguards against arbitrariness and confusion
about which definition would be employed in which sorts of cases. If
some case could warrant a death pronouncement by one definition and
not by the other, confusion would result; if one patient were pronounced
dead in accordance with one definition and another patient in the same
condition and in the same jurisdiction were declared to be alive by the
other, inequity would result.2 0  Although the multivocity involved in
"alternative definitions" is not necessarily vicious, a single definition
establishing a single meaning certainly has the advantage of simplicity.
D. Designation of a State Whose Onset Is Instantaneous
Because determination of death has effects on inheritance and rights
of survivorship, death must be defined as a state whose onset is instanta-
20. For criticisms of the "alternative definitions" of death enacted in Kansas, see
text accompanying notes 24-28.
Vol. 1975:979] 989
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neous and temporally fixed. In this respect, the stipulation will be
continuous with the traditional use of the term.
The debate whether death is a process occurring over a period of time
or an instantaneous event is confused. 2' Death, in the traditional sense,
is neither a process nor an event, but a state. More specifically, the
term "death" traditionally designates the state of having permanently
lost the capacity to exercise certain functions. Those who argue that
death connotes an instantaneous event might be confusing the state itself
with its onset, its coming into being, which is instantaneous. The onset
of death is necessarily instantaneous because the state indicated by the
term "death" has no degrees, and between it and its opposite there is no
middle position. In contrast, for instance, there is a middle between
poverty and wealth; consequently, through a gradual process, an indi-
vidual can become more wealthy or less poor. In relation to life and
death as they are traditionally understood, however, a person has either
irreversibly lost the relevant capacities and is, therefore, dead, or he has
not. If anything is gradual, it is the process called "dying," which is
part of life, not death. A biologist might point out that total death of an
organism, including death of all organs, tissues, and cells, need not
occur simultaneously. He would reflect more accurately the traditional
sense of the term "death" if he spoke of a series of instantaneous occur-
rences rather than a continuous process; the serial occurrences are the
commencements of states of irreversible loss of capacity in various
systems, subsystems, and units composing the organism.
E. Designation of an Irreversible State
The definition should indicate some state of lost capacity only insofar
as it is irreversible by ordinary medical procedures. Unimaginable
confusion about legal rights, such as inheritance and rights of survivor-
ship, would be introduced by creating semantically a category of persons
who, having overcome some state of incapacity, could be said to have
been dead temporarily. Nor does it make literal sense to say that a
resuscitated person was dead temporarily. 22
21. See Kass, supra note 11; Morison, Death: Process or Event?, 173 SCIENcE 694
(1971).
22. Serious thought has already been given to the legal implications of "cryogenic
interment," the freezing of patients who have been declared dead, and of the revival of
those patients at some date in the distant future. See Gomey, The New Biology and
the Future of Man, 15 U.C.L.A. L. Rnv. 273, 323-25 (1968); Henderson & Ettinger,
Cryonic Suspension and the Law, 15 U.C.L.A. L. Rnv. 414 (1968).
Such remote possibilities of revival must be excluded from the general notion of irre-
[Vol. 1975:979
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F. Acceptability to the Public
Because it is an act that determines the persons to whom certain basic
human protections are extended and rights granted, stipulating a legal
definition of the term "death" must meet the ethical requirement of a
pluralistic and democratic society. The rule of action must be one that
all or most persons are willing to have applied to themselves. If citizens
are to participate, as they should, each citizen should ask himself the
following questions: Under which kind of permanent incapacity am I
willing to have removed from me (i) the rights and protections guaran-
teed to me as a living person and (ii) the duties and responsibilities
imposed upon me for those in my care? Am I willing to have these
removed only if irreversible loss of all vital functions is sustained? Or
am I willing to have these removed if irreversible loss of consciousness is
suffered even though heart action continues spontaneously? Other
questions of this kind may follow.
In making a choice of the kind of incapacity to be defined as death,
there is no reason that the facilitation of organ transplantation, for
example, should not be one of many factors considered. Death should
be defined in such a way that its pronouncement establishes legal rights
and duties that are consistent with the preference of all or most citizens,
each one of whom will eventually have the law applied to himself. Once
the informed preference of the public is determined and an appropriate
definition of death is adopted, however, no practical consideration, such
as the facilitation of transplantation, should be considered in determin-
ing the empirical criteria for diagnosing the occurrence of the incapacity
defined as death. Establishing criteria is a factual process requiring
scientific inquiry into the empirically sufficient conditions for the occur-
rence of death in the sense previously defined; the criteria cannot be
established in advance of the definition.
"mT. CRITIQUE AND PROPOSAL
The outstanding proposals, decisions, and statutes concerning the
redefinition of death can be conveniently divided into six kinds: (a)
the "alternative definitions" approach which reasserts, with some preci-
sion, the traditional definition and adds a second that recognizes per-
manent loss of brain function as death; (b) the "refined criteria"
versibility that should be embodied in current laws defining death; the irreversibility of
functional incapacity should relate only to current medical capabilities.
Vol. 1975:9791
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approach wherein, in lieu of a definition, new tests and methods are set
forth for determining the status of the cases falling in the uncertain area
between life and death as traditionally understood; (c) the "single total
brain death" definition by which a patient can be pronounced dead if
and only if irreversible loss of all brain function is sustained; (d) the
"open-ended brain death" approach which legalizes brain death as one
definition or criterion of death without excluding other definitions or
criteria that are and may come to be accepted; (e) the "cortical death"
(or "cerebral death") definition which involves extending the boundary
of death to include any patient who has sustained permanent loss of the
functioning of the brain cortex or cerebrum; and (f) the "psychological
death" definition which identifies death with the permanent loss of
consciousness by the human organism. The merits of these approaches
must be analyzed in light of semantic and ethical requirements.
(a) In 1970 the Kansas legislature adopted the "alternative defini-
tions" approach to defining death:
A person will be considered medically and legally dead if, in the opinion
of a physician, based on ordinary standards of medical practice there is
the absence of spontaneous respiratory and cardiac function and, be-
cause of the disease or condition which caused, directly or indirectly,
these functions to cease, or because of the passage of time since these
functions ceased, attempts at resuscitation are considered hopeless; and,
in this event, death will have occurred at the time these functions
ceased; or
A person will be considered medically and legally dead if, in the
opinion of a physician, based on ordinary standards of medical practice,
there is the absence of spontaneous brain function; and if based on
ordinary standards of medical practice, during reasonable attempts to
either maintain or restore spontaneous circulatory or respiratory func-
tion in the absence of the aforesaid brain function, it appears that fur-
ther attempts at resuscitation or supportive maintenance will not suc-
ceed, death will have occurred at the time when these conditions first
coincide. Death is to be pronounced before artificial means of support-
ing respiratory and circulatory function are terminated and before any
vital organ is removed for purposes of transplantation.
These alternative definitions of death are to be utilized for all purposes
in this state, including trials of civil and criminal cases, any laws to the
contrary notwithstanding. 23
23. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 77-202 (Supp. 1975).
[Vol. 1975:979
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The Kansas statute, and the Maryland, 24 New Mexico, 21 and Virgi-
nia 26 statutes later modeled upon it, have a number of virtues. They
24. The 1972 Maryland statute defining death is modeled on the Kansas statute, dif-
fering only in that the words "in the opinion of a physician" in the first sentence of
the first paragraph of the Kansas statute have been eliminated; the words "and because
of a known disease or condition" have been added to the first sentence of the second
paragraph immediately after the words "based on ordinary standards of medical prac-
tice." MD. ANN. CODE art. 43, § 54F (Supp. 1975).
25. The 1973 New Mexico statute is quite similar to the Kansas and Maryland stat-
anes, adding only that the law defining death does not affect the law of presumptive de-
cedents in that state. In full, the New Mexico statute is as follows:
A. For all medical, legal and statutory purposes, death of a human being
occurs when, and "death," "dead body," and "dead person" or any other refer-
ence to human death means that:
(1) based on ordinary standards of medical practice, there is the absence
of spontaneous respiratory and cardiac function and, because of the disease or
condition which caused, directly or indirectly, these functions to cease, or be-
cause of the passage of time since these functions ceased, there is no reasonable
possibility of restoring respiratory or cardiac functions; in this event death
occurs at the time respiratory or cardiac functions ceased; or
(2) in the opinion of a physician, based on ordinary standards of medical
practice: (a) because of a known disease or condition there is the absence of
spontaneous brain function; and (b) after reasonable attempts to either main-
tain or restore spontaneous circulatory or respiratory functions in the absence
of spontaneous brain function, it appears that further attempts at resuscitation
and supportive maintenance have no reasonable possibility of restoring spon-
taneous brain function; in this event death will have occurred at the time when
the absence of spontaneous brain function first occurred. Death is to be pro-
nounced pursuant to this paragraph before artificial means of supporting respir-
atory or circulatory functions are terminated and before any vital organ is re-
moved for purposes of transplantation in compliance with the Uniform Ana-
tomical Gift Act.
B. The alternative definitions of death in Paragraphs (1) and (2) of sub-
section A of this section are to be utilized for all purposes in this state, includ-
ing but not limited to civil and criminal actions, notwithstanding any other law
to the contrary.
N.M. STAT. ANN. 1-2-2.2 (Supp. 1975).
26. The 1973 Virginia statute defining death, clearly modeled on the Kansas statute,
includes several innovations. It makes clear, as the Kansas, Maryland, and New Mexico
statutes do not, that for death to have occurred in accordance with the brain death def-
inition, spontaneous respiration must also have ceased. The statute also requires that
a consulting physician who is a specialist in neurology, neurosurgery, or electroencepha-
lography make the determination of brain death. By specifying the physician who must
make the determination, the Virginia statute not only establishes the definition of death
but also affects the criteria of death.
According to the Virginia statute:
A person shall be medically and legally dead if, (a) in the opinion of a
physician duly authorized to practice medicine in this State, based on ordinary
standards of medical practice, there is the absence of spontaneous respiratory
and spontaneous cardiac functions and, because of the disease or condition
which directly or indirectly caused these functions to cease, or because of the
passage of time since these functions ceased, attempts at resuscitation would
not, in the opinion of such physician, be successful in restoring spontaneousWashington University Open Scholarship
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define death in terms of conditions that are readily discoverable by
medical professionals, if not by the layman. Additionally, because the
statutes do not force the medical profession to use particular criteria,
developments in diagnostic methods are not hampered. The statutes
also avoid some of the vagueness of the traditional definition of death.
Accordingly, the statutes specify that absence of "spontaneous" function
is pertinent in determining whether death has occurred; the traditional
definition is ambiguous when applied to patients whose vital functions
are maintained artificially. Furthermore, under the statutes a physician
may determine that resuscitation efforts are "hopeless" or "will not
succeed" or are lacking a "reasonable possibility" of success (that is,
that the cessation of function is irreversible) based upon "ordinary
standards of medical practice." This refinement is important because
what is hopeless or irreversible with respect to certain remedial meas-
ures need not be so with respect to others.
All of the "alternative definitions" statutes, however, make "death" a
multivocal term. Taken literally, the statutes have several rather bizarre
implications that their makers certainly could not have intended. For
example, the first of the "alternative definitions" provides that a person
will be considered dead if spontaneous respiratory and spontaneous
cardiac functions are absent and if attempts at resuscitation are deemed
hopeless. The second provides that a person will be considered dead if
spontaneous brain function is absent and if it appears that attempts at
resuscitation or supportive maintenance will not succeed. The statutes
do not specify that the first definition applies only if no artificial support
life-sustaining functions, and, in such event, death shall be deemed to have oc-
curred at the time these functions ceased; or (b) in the opinion of a consulting
physician, who shall be duly licensed and a specialist in the field of neurology,
neurosurgery, or electroencephlography [sic], when based on the ordinary stand-
ards of medical practice, there is the absence of spontaneous brain functions and
spontaneous respiratory functions and, in the opinion of the attending physi-
cian and such consulting physician, based on the ordinary standards of medical
practice and considering the absence of the aforesaid spontaneous brain func-
tions and spontaneous respiratory functions and the patient's medical record,
further attempts at resuscitation or continued supportive maintenance would
not be successful in restoring such spontaneous functions, and, in such event,
death shall be deemed to have occurred at the time when these conditions first
coincide. Death, as defined in subsection (b) hereof, shall be pronounced by
the attending physician and recorded in the patient's medical record and at-
tested by the aforesaid consulting physician.
Notwithstanding any statutory or common law to the contrary, either of
these alternative definitions of death may be utilized for all purposes in the
Commonwealth, including the trial of civil and criminal cases.
VA. CODE § 32-364.3:1 (Supp. 1975).
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of respiratory and cardiac function is employed and that otherwise the
second definition applies. Thus, the statutes could be interpreted to
mean that a patient who suffers irreversible loss of spontaneous respira-
tory and spontaneous cardiac function, but who remains conscious be-
cause of the use of the appropriate artificial support, is dead by the first
definition. The same patient by the second definition is not dead,
however, as long as those portions of the brain serving consciousness
continue to function.
An analogous implication of the Kansas statute was noted by I.M.
Kennedy. "[Patient] X at a certain stage in the process of dying can be
pronounced dead, whereas [patient] Y, having arrived at the same
point, is not said to be dead. 27  By the second definition patient X is
dead if the specified brain damage is sustained even though his heart-
beat continues spontaneously. By the first definition, however, patient
Y is not dead just because his heartbeat continues spontaneously. As
Kennedy complains, "[ilt is in no way inspiring of confidence in one's
doctor to learn that there are two types of death."' 8  Clearly, the
problems arising from the multivocity of the Kansas statute should
prevent other states from adopting similar statutes.
(b) Efforts have been made to bypass the issue of the definition or
redefinition of death and to develop "refined criteria." Under new
empirical tests, physicians could diagnose the occurrence of death in
difficult cases involving the use of artificial means of life-support.
Alexander Capron and Leon Kass, claiming to have deferred considera-
tion of the basic concept of death, proposed model legislation that
provided two "general physiological standards" for recognizing the oc-
currence of death: "irreversible cessation of spontaneous respiratory
and circulatory function" and, "[i]n the event that artificial means of
support preclude a determination that these functions have ceased,...
irreversible cessation of spontaneous brain functions." 9  The Task
Force on Death and Dying of the Institute of Society, Ethics, and the
Life Sciences 30 and the American Medical Association (AMA)3 1 also
27. Kennedy, supra note 16, at 948.
28. Id. at 947.
29. Capron & Kass, supra note 18, at 111.
30. Task Force on Death and Dying of the Institute of Society, Ethics, and the Life
Sciences, Refinements in Criteria for the Determination of Death: An Appraisal, 221
J.A.M.A. 48, 49 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Task Force].
31. American Medical Association, Proceedings of the House of Delegates: Clinical
Convention, Anaheim, Calif., Dec. 2-5, 1973, at 136 [hereinafter cited as AMA Pro-
ceedings: Clinical 19731.
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believe that the current controversy about death can be resolved satis-
factorily at the level of criteria without affecting the level of definition.
Both groups recognize cessation of brain function as one of several ac-
ceptable criteria of death.32
In 1975, Michigan, drawing on the language of the model statute of
Capron and Kass, enacted legislation providing two "means of deter-
mining death: 3 3
(1) A person will be considered dead if in the announced opinion
of a physician, based on ordinary standards of medical practice in the
community, there is the irreversible cessation of spontaneous respira-
tory and circulatory functions. If artificial means of support preclude
a determination that these functions have ceased, a person will be con-
sidered dead if in the announced opinion of a physician, based on
ordinary standards of medical practice in the community, there is the
irreversible cessation of spontaneous brain functions. Death will have
occurred at the time when the relevant functions ceased.
(2) Death is to be pronounced before artificial means of supporting
respiratory and circulatory functions are terminated.
(3) The means of determining death in subsection (1) shall be
used for all purposes in this state, including the trials of civil and crimi-
nals cases.34
Much of the language of the Capron and Kass model statute also
appears in legislation enacted earlier in West Virginia" and Alaska.3 In
32. Task Force 49-51; American Medical Association, Proceedings of the House of
Delegates: Clinical Convention, Portland, Ore., Dec. 1-4, 1974, at 303.
33. Act No. 158, Mich. Pub. Acts of 1975 (July 23, 1975).
34. Id. Subsection (1) of the Michigan statute is very similar to the model statute
developed by Alexander Capron and Leo Kass. Capron & Kass, supra note 18, at 111.
Subsection (1) differs only in that the words "in the community" have been added in
the first and second sentences following the words "ordinary standards of medical prac-
tice;" the words "there is the" replace the words "he has experienced an" in both the
first and second sentences; and the word "If" replaces the words "In the event that" at
the beginning of the second sentence.
35. W. VA. CoDE ANN. § 16-19-1(b) (Supp. 1975) provides:
"Death" means that a person will be considered dead if in the announced opin-
ion of the attending physician, based on ordinary standards of medical practice,
the patient has experienced an irreversible cessation of spontaneous respiratory
and circulatory functions; or, in the event that artificial means of support pre-
clude a determination that these functions have ceased, a person will be consid-
ered dead if in the announced opinion of a physician, based on ordinary stand-
ards of medical practice, the patient has experienced an irreversible cessation
of spontaneous brain functions.
Death will have occurred at the time when the relevant functions ceased.
Id.
36. ALASKA STAT. § 09.65.120 (Supp. 1975) provides:https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1975/iss4/3
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both of these states, however, the statutes were intended to determine
the definition and not merely the various criteria of death.
Capron and Kass propose legislation that would determine nothing
more than the general physiological standards for diagnosing the occur-
rence of death because they consider the "basic concept of death" a
"philosophical matter," about which "differences of opinion would seem
to be hard to resolve, and agreement, if it were possible, would provide
little guidance for practice." 7 In contrast, they believe that standards,
criteria, and tests are "medico-technical" matters and as such are amen-
able, presumably, to definite determination. 38 If Capron and Kass are
correct in thinking that current problems concerning death can be
treated satisfactorily as simply criterional and, thus, medico-technical
problems, then statutory changes are neither desirable nor necessary, as
both the Task Force on Death and Dying 9 and the AMA 40 point out.
Treating the problem as a criterional, rather than a definitional, issue,
however, raises several questions.
First, the definition of the "basic concept" of death can be settled in a
way that is both decisive and publicly defensible, as long as it is
perceived as a matter of choice-a choice that the public can make in
light of preferred arrangements of rights, duties, and protections.
Second, the question of the definition of the basic concept of death
cannot be avoided. The general physiological standards or criteria first
identified by Capron and Kass, and followed by the Michigan statute,
the Task Force on Death and Dying, and the AMA are extensionally
equivalent to a single definition of death in terms of irreversible loss of
brain functions. That is to say, those cases and only those cases
numbered among the dead by the "brain death" definition would also
DEF rON oF DEATH. A person is considered medically and legally dead if,
in the opinion of a medical doctor licensed or exempt from licensing under AS
08.64, based on ordinary standards of medical practice, there is no spontaneous
respiratory or cardiac function and there is no expectation of recovery of spon-
taneous respiratory or cardiac function or, in the case when respiratory and
cardiac functions are maintained by artificial means, a person is considered
medically and legally dead, if, in the opinion of a medical doctor licensed or
exempt from licensing under AS 08.64, based on ordinary standards of medical
practice, there is no spontaneous brain function. Death may be pronounced
in this circumstance before artificial means of maintaining respiratory and
cardiac function are terminated.
37. Capron & Kass, supra note 18, at 102-03.
38. Id.
39. TaskForce 51.
40. AMA Proceedings: Clinical 1973, 136.
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be numbered among the dead under the general physiological standards
suggested by Capron and Kass. As Capron and Kass themselves point
out, the
two standards ... measur[e] different manifestations of the same phe-
nomenon. If cardiac and pulmonary functions have ceased, brain func-
tions have ceased, brain functions cannot continue; if there is no brain
activity and respiration has to be maintained artificially, the same state
(i.e., death) exists. 41
Thus, at least implicitly, a definition of death in terms of brain death
underlies this attempt to develop criteria of death.
Third, the use of brain death as a criterion and, in effect, an implicit
definition of death involves a change from traditional notions. Death in
the traditional sense necessarily involves cessation of spontaneous heart-
beat; cardiac arrest is not required under the brain death formulation,
however, since cardiac function is somewhat independent of central
nervous activity. 42 The Task Force, among others, maintains that using
irreversible loss of brain function as a criterion of death is consistent
with the traditional understanding of death; it argues that the heartbeat
of a brain-damaged patient on a mechanical respirator is an "artifact"
and not a spontaneous function because circulation and respiration are
intimately connected.43 The dependence of one thing on another for
the long term sustentation of its function, however, does not imply that
the function is not spontaneous. The otherwise normal respiration of a
patient with a cardiac pacemaker, for example, does not cease to be a
spontaneous life function just because it would terminate were the
pacemaker removed.
If the definition of death is to become the irreversible cessation of
brain function, the change should be accomplished explicitly through an
appropriate statute. Once this were done, the medical profession could
use as a criterion of death any phenomenon it discovered to be an
empirically sufficient condition of death as so defined. By adopting a
new criterion of death in advance of an appropriate change in the law,
however, the medical profession would assume a right it should not
have.
(c) The straightforward identification of human death with "total
brain death" was supported by the American Bar Association (ABA) in
41. Capron & Kass, supra note 18, at 112.
42. Harvard Committee, 340.
43. See, e.g., Task Force 50.
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a resolution passed by its House of Delegates in 1975:
Be It Resolved, that the American Bar Association adopts a current
definition of death as follows:
"For all legal purposes, a human body with irreversible cessation
of total brain function, according to the usual and customary standards
of medical practice, shall be considered dead."' '
If taken as a proposal for a single definition of death, and not as a
supplement to the traditional definition, this resolution identifies death
with a single sort of occurrence.
Oklahoma in 1975 enacted legislation that stipulates a single defini-
tion of death. The Oklahoma statute provides that "[tihe term 'dead
body' means a human body in which there is irreversible total cessation
of brain function. 45 By cessation of "total brain function" and "total
cessation of brain function," the ABA and the Oklahoma statute refer to
permanent loss of brain stem activity, which supports respiration, as well
as higher brain activity, which supports consciousness. This single
definition approach avoids the ambiguity of the "alternative definitions"
enacted in Kansas as well as the confusion about the "two types of
death." At the same time, the single "brain death" definition includes
among the dead, brain-dead patients on mechanical respirators whose
hearts continue to beat, in addition to patients not on mechanical life-
support systems who are dead according to the traditional rule of
cardiopulmonary arrest; the oxygen-deprived brains of these former
patients would also be dead.
The condition identified as death in the ABA resolution and the
Oklahoma statute presents no peculiar problems of empirical verifica-
tion in cases likely to be encountered in the foreseeable future. Unless
artificial means of supporting cardiac or respiratory function have been
employed, short term cessation of heartbeat or respiration is a reliable
indicator or criterion of brain death. If oxygenated blood ceases to flow
to the brain, profound and irreversible damage to the brain occurs
within several minutes, and death, as here discussed, occurs. On the
other hand, when artificial life-support systems are used, the occurrence
of death in this sense can be determined by using the test for brain death
set forth in the 1968 report of the Harvard Committee.40
44. 61 A.B.A.J. 463, 464 (1975) (report on the recommendations of the House of
Delegates).
45. OraL. STAT. ANN. § 1-301(g) (Supp. 1975).
46. See note 17 supra.
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In every important way, the single definition of death as the perma-
nent loss of total brain function is superior to the "alternative defini-
tions" enacted in Kansas and the "refined criteria" of death recommend-
ed by Capron and Kass and others, enacted in Michigan. Precise,
unambiguous, and straightforward from the definitional viewpoint, the
single definition covers the same cases intended to be included under the
Kansas "alternative definitions" and the Michigan alternative "means"
or criteria. Thus, if the public would choose this incapacity as the basis
for a pronouncement of death, state legislatures should adopt the single
"total brain death" definition of human death.
The public, however, must be informed that such a definition of
death places a determining emphasis on brain stem activity and, hence,
also on spontaneous respiratory function. Thus, according to a "total
brain death" rule, a patient who is permanently comatose as a result of
brain damage could be pronounced dead only if damage is so extensive
that permanent cessation of spontaneous respiration is also sustained.
On the other hand, another permanently comatose patient who requires
artificial respiratory assistance would be considered dead, even though
heartbeat continues spontaneously.4 7
If the public felt that rights and protections should be afforded in
accord with a person's capacity for consciousness (the capacity to be
aware of events in the world or within himself), a definition of death
that ultimately emphasizes the capacity for consciousness should be
adopted. Loss of brain stem activity and the respiration it supports
should not play a determining role as they do when "total brain death"
defines human death.
(d) Instead of adopting statutes that put restrictions on which defini-
tions or criteria must be employed in pronouncing death, the California
47. J.B. Brierley and his medical colleagues report two cases of permanently coma-
tose patients who resumed spontaneous respiration after cardiac arrest and remained in
that state for five months before pulmonary collapse. Brierley, Adams, Graham & Simp.
son, Neocortical Death After Cardiac Arrest, 2 LANCET 560 (1971) thereinafter cited as
Brierley].
Uneasy with the position that respiration must cease before death can be said to occur,
Brierley and his colleagues raised the following point:
Once neocortical death has been unequivocally established and the possibility
of any recovery of consciousness and intellectual activity thereby excluded, the
question must be asked, although [a] patient breathes spontaneously, is he or
she alive?
Id. at 565.
[Vol. 1975:979
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legislature has simply legalized "brain death" as one criterion or defini-
tion of human death. The legislature in no way prohibited the use of
other accepted criteria or definitions, nor did it close the door to
developments in medical technology and in public interest. Death of
the cortex of the brain or irreversible loss of all consciousness, for ex-
ample, might be accepted in the future as proper criteria or definitions
of death. According to the California statute:
A person shall be pronounced dead if it is determined by a physician
that the person has suffered a total and irreversible cessation of brain
function. There shall be independent confirmation of the death by
another physician.
Nothing in this chapter shall prohibit a physician from using other usual
and customary procedures for determining such death as the exclusive
basis for pronouncing a person dead.48
The wisdom of this "open-ended" approach to the issue of the definition
of death is obvious, particularly in light of proposals for "cortical death"
and "psychological death" definitions.
(e) Recent and developing interest in a "cortical death" (or "cerebral
death") definition of human death is motivated by a desire to reevaluate
the cessation of spontaneous respiratory function and spontaneous car-
diac function as necessary features of human death. 49  The cortical
death definition would make the permanent loss of consciousness the
basic constituent of human death.
The physiological integrity of the cerebral cortex has been estab-
lished as an empirically necessary condition for consciousness.5 ° Thus,
a "cortical death" definition of human death would require permanent
loss of consciousness in anyone pronounced dead. Cortical destruction,
or destruction of the entire cerebrum of which the cortex is a part,
would not, however, necessarily result in loss of spontaneous respiration,
a function of lower brain stem activity.
If by public consensus living persons should be distinguished from the
dead based upon their capacity for consciousness, "cortical death" or
48. CALIF. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 7180 (Deering 1975).
49. See, e.g., Brierley 265; Fletcher, New Definitions of Death, 2 PRiSM, Jan.
1974, at 36; Olinger, supra note 10, at 22; Rizzo & Yonder, Definition and Criteria of
Clinical Death. 40 LINACRE Q. 223, 230 (1973); Death of a Human Being, 2 LANCET
590 (1971) (editorial).
50. See, e.g., J. ECCLEs, THE NEutOPYnsIoLoaIcAL BASIs OF MnD 260-67 (1953).
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"cerebral death" should be treated merely as a criterion of human death;
human death itself should be defined in purely psychological terms, such
as the irreversible loss of the capacity for any sort of consciousness.
First, the psychological phenomenon of consciousness is not conceptual-
ly identical with any neurophysiological occurrence, although an invar-
iant, empirical connection exists between the occurrence of conscious-
ness and the occurrence of neurological events in the cerebrum and its
cortex. Even though consciousness occurs only when neural activity
takes place in the cerebrum, descriptions of consciousness itself are not
conceptually equivalent to descriptions of neural activity in the cere-
brum; introspective psychological reports do not describe the brain.51
Thus, a "cortical death" or "cerebral death" definition differs from a
definitional identification of death with the permanent loss of conscious-
ness. Second, the integrity of the cerebrum and the cortex appears to be
but one of several empirically necessary conditions of consciousness.
Research suggests that interference with certain regions of the brain
stem also invariably causes loss of consciousness. 2 Thus, death should
not be defined in terms of cortical or cerebral damage alone if every
permanently comatose patient is to be considered dead.
(f) Under a "psychological definition" of death the permanent loss
of consciousness alone constitutes the death of a human. The following
model statute is proposed for consideration by the public:
For all legal purposes, a person will be considered dead if in the
announced opinion of a physician, according to the usual and customary
standards of medical practice, there is the irreversible loss of all con-
sciousness. Death will have commenced at the time the loss became
irreversible.
This definition of death is to be used for all purposes in the state,
including the trials of civil and criminal cases.
51. Philosophers have interpreted the invariant connection between consciousness
and certain neurological events in the brain, vis-h-vis their conceptual difference, as (1)
numerically distinct events that are somehow causally connected to each other; (2) nu-
merically distinct events that occur synchronously without being causally connected, rea-
soning that a causal connection of events so radically different in kind is unintelligible;
and (3) distinct and irreducible aspects of what is, in fact, one event. For an analysis
and evaluation of the three interpretations of the empirically discovered connection of
these psychological and physiological events, see Charron, The Simplicity of Conscious
Experiences: A Problem for Neural Identity Theory, 51 THE MODERN SCHOOLMAN 335
(1974).
52. See, e.g., W. PENPImLD, ThE ExcrrABLE COR=m IN CONSCIOUS MAN (1958).
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This recommended definition of death in terms of irreversible loss of
consciousness must not be confused with that of the Harvard Commit-
tee's 1968 report, A Definition of Irreversible Coma, and its "primary
purpose [of defining] irreversible coma as a new criterion for death.""aa
Rather than recommending that permanent loss of consciousness by
itself be the criterion, or definition, of death, the Harvard Committee
suggested that the permanent loss of all brain function, brain stem
activity and higher brain function alike, be recognized as the criterion of
death.54 Thus, for the Harvard Committee, permanent coma in the
sense of permanent loss of consciousness, alone insufficient to support a
finding of death, is but one "sign" or "characteristic" of the occurrence
of total brain death. The 1968 report is important technically for its
discussion of the specific clinical signs or characteristics by which the
physician can diagnose "brain death," the permanent loss of total brain
function.55
Reliable criteria for diagnosing the occurrence of death in the psy-
chological sense have already, in effect, been discovered. Because the
physiological integrity of various parts of the brain is empirically neces-
sary for consciousness, all phenomena that indicate total brain death
also indicate a fortiori irreversible loss of consciousness. Thus, without
artificial maintenance of cardiac and respiratory function, arrest of
heartbeat and respiration indicate death in the proposed psychological
sense; permanent and profound brain damage will result when the
required oxygenated blood ceases to flow to the brain. If artificial
means of life-support are used, the Harvard Committee's tests for "brain
death" can be employed to confirm the permanent loss of consciousness
constituting "psychological death." Medical science would then have to
develop reliable tests for diagnosing the irreversible disintegration of the
specific brain parts upon which the human organism's capacity for
consciousness depends.58
53. Harvard Committee, supra note 17, at 337.
54. Id. at 337-38.
55. See note 17 supra.
56. J.B. Brierley and his colleagues claim that
[in the specific context of cardiac arrest, . .. the existence of irreversible
neocortical destruction can be established [with the use of the electroencepha-
lograph] within a few days of the arrest provided that drugs with a central
depressive effect are not being given. If any element of doubt should then re-
main, neocortical death could be confirmed by the appropriate neuropatholog-
ical examination of a biopsy specimen (a 1-1.5 cm. cube) taken from the pos-
terior half of the cerebral hemisphere.
Brierley 565. But see Silverman, Masland, Saunders & Schwab, EEG and Cerebral
Death. The Neurologist's View, 27 ELEcrRoENcEPII. CLiN. NEUOPrHYSIOL. 549 (1969).
Vol. 1975:979] 1003
Washington University Open Scholarship
1004 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 1975:979
The identification of death with permanent loss of consciousness
remedies the vagueness of the traditional concept when applied to
permanently comatose patients maintained on artificial life-support sys-
tems; it identifies a single state as human death and, thus avoids the
vicious ambiguity of the Kansas "alternative definitions" approach. 7
Additionally, it identifies death as a permanent state with an instanta-
neous, ascertainable onset.
Only if the "psychological death" definition meets with public ap-
proval, however, can an alteration of the traditional definition be ethi-
cally defensible. A Missouri public opinion survey indicates that the
public, with its present state of information and reflection on the subject,
is hesitant to reject the traditional definition of death which requires loss
of all vital functions. 8 The majority of those who do favor a move
away from the traditional definition have preferences that accord with
the proposed "psychological definition" of death rather than with the
"total brain death" definition, or criterion, under consideration in the
Missouri legislature. 59 Thus, the majority of those who would redefine
death do not consider spontaneous respiration a decisive factor in deter-
mining whether someone is alive. Rather, they stress permanent loss of
consciousness.
57. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 77-202 (Supp. 1975).
58. Research and Information, Inc., Missouri Public Opinion Report 60, Sept. 1975;
Research and Information, Inc., Missouri Public Opinion Report 65, Nov. 1975.
In state-wide opinion surveys conducted in September and November 1975, Research
and Information, Inc., included, at the author's request, a question concerning the atti-
tudes of Missouri residents toward changes in the definition of death. With the permis-
sion of the firm, the results of these surveys have been reprinted. See Appendix, infra.
It is well to note that the survey of November 1975 was conducted after the saturation
news coverage of the case of Karen Ann Quinlan, see note 5 supra, which increased
public awareness of many of the complexities in defining death, as well as the issues
in the question of the "right to die." A comparison of the November 1975 survey with
the earlier survey conducted in September 1975 shows a marked movement toward the
acceptance of the permanent loss of all consciousness as constituting human death.
59. At the time this Commentary went to press, two bills were pending in the Mis-
souri legislature: S. 670, 78th Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (1976); H. 1083, 78th Gen.
Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (1976). The former is a verbatim restatement of the Capron
and Kass model statute determining the criteria or "means for determining death." See
note 29 supra and accompanying text. The latter, entitled "An Act to Define Death
for Legal Purposes," proposes that "[flor all legal purposes a human body with irre-
versible cessation of total brain functions according to usual and customary standards
of medical practice shall be considered dead." The Senate shelved S. 670 and author-
ized the President Pro Tern to appoint a Senate Select Committee on the Definition of
Death to study the problem.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1975/iss4/3
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IV. CONCLUSION
In this interdisciplinary debate on one of the great social issues of our
time, state legislatures and courts rush to institute "(total) brain death"
as a restrictive definition or criterion of death for those not dead
according to the traditional definition. What should be sought through
all the debate is the informed preference of the public who, ethically,
should be the dominant influence in determining an issue of choice.
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APPENDIX
The Missouri Public Opinion Report is published by Research and Infor-
mation, Inc., St. Louis, Missouri. It is a series of public opinion issue studies
of samples of about 500 randomly selected Missouri residents each quarter.
The September 1975 survey was conducted September 13-28; the November
survey was conducted November 15-December 1. The sample contained
proportionate representation of the ten United States Congressional Districts
in Missouri as follows:
District Percentage
8%
11%
8%
11%
8%
10%
10%
13%
12%
9%
In both surveys the following question was asked: Traditionally, a person
has been considered dead only when both the heart and lungs have ceased
to function. Organ transplants and the use of artificial respirators have
raised questions about when a person is to be considered dead. In your
opinion, when should a person be considered dead: When the person has
permanently lost all consciousness as a result of brain damage, even though
the heart and lungs continue to function? When the person has permanently
lost both consciousness and lung function, even though the heart continues
to beat? Or, only when the heart, lungs, and consciousness have all perma-
nently stopped?
MISSOURI PUBLIC OPINION REPORT, SEPTEMBER 1975
All respondents
Urban
Rural
Male
Female
White Collar
Blue Collar
(N)
(471)
(229)
(242)
(235)
(236)
(119)
(69)
Permanently
lost con-
sciousness
21.7
22.7
20.7
21.7
21.6
34.5
21.7
Last con-
sciousness
and lung
function
7.0
9.2
5.0
9.4
4.7
Lost con-
sciousness,
lung and heart
function
71.3
68.1
74.4
68.9
73.7
9.2 56.3
8.7 69.6
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Farm (22)
Service (46)
Housewife (104)
Non-occupational (111)
Non-high school
graduate (146)
High school graduate (155)
To two years college (77)
Two years on/college
degree (69)
Advanced degree (22)
Under $5,000 (85)
Over $5,000 to
$7,000 (61)
Over $7,000 to
$10,000 (80)
Over $10,000 to
$17,000 (141)
Over $17,000 (86)
18-30 years old (127)
31-45 years old (148)
46-62 years old (108)
63 years old and older (87)
Voted last major
election (314)
Did not vote last major
election (156)
Republican (95)
Democrat (210)
Independent or other (162)
MISSOURI PUBLIC OPINION REPORT,
All respondents
Urban
Rural
Male
Female
White Collar
Blue Collar
Farm
Service
Housewife
Non-occupational
(N)
(455)
(223)
(232)
(223)
(231)
(115)
(89)
(31)
(49)
(84)
(87)
Permanently
lost con-
sciousness
37.8
40.4
35.7
40.7
35.0
36.6
43.3
29.0
38.8
32.1
28.7
NOVEMBER
Lost con-
sciousness s
and lung lur
functions
5.0
6.6
4.0
4.9
5.2
13.8
3.3
12.9
8.1
2.4
5.8
1975
Lost con-
ciousness,
ag and heart
function
57.1
53.0
60.3
54.7
59.9
49.6
52.8
58.0
53.0
65.4
65.5
4.5
15.2
22.1
13.5
12.3
20.6
27.3
34.8
31.8
10.6
19.7
18.8
25.5
30.2
26.8
23.6
22.2
9.2
24.5
16.0
23.2
19.0
24.7
4.5
4.3
3.8
8.1
8.2
5.8
3.9
8.7
13.6
11.8
1.6
5.0
7.8
8.1
3.1
10.8
3.7
10.3
7.3
6.4
7.4
6.2
8.0
90.9
80.4
74.0
78.4
79.5
73.5
68.8
56.5
54.5
77.6
78.7
76.3
66.7
61.6
70.1
65.5
74.1
80.5
68.2
77.6
69.5
74.8
67.3
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Non-high school
graduate (105) 34.2 2.8 62.8
High school graduate (184) 41.2 3.2 55.3
To -two years college (80) 32.5 9.9 57.4
Two years on/college
degree (67) 37.3 7.4 55.2
Advanced degree (19) 47.3 5.2 47.3
Under $5,000 (74) 29.7 5.3 64.9
Over $5,000 to
$7,000 (54) 20.3 3.6 75.8
Over $7,000 to
$10,000 (83) 42.1 7.2 50.6
Over $10,000 to
$17,000 (148) 41.9 2.7 55.4
Over $17,000 (87) 45.9 8.0 45.9
18-30 years old (136) 41.9 8.7 49.2
31-45 years old (137) 43.7 2.2 54.0
46-62 years old (104) 25.9 3.8 70.2
63 years old and over (77) 35.0 5.1 59.7
Voted last major
election (284) 39.4 3.8 56.6
Did not vote last
major election (169) 34.8 7.0 58.0
Republican (108) 33.3 5.5 61.1
Democrat (214) 34.5 4.2 61.2
Independent or other (130) 46.1 6.1 47.7
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1975/iss4/3
WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY
LAW QUARTERLY
Member, National Conference of Law Reviews
VOLUME 1975 NUMBER 4
Edited by the Undergraduates of Washington University School of Law, St. Louis.
Published: Winter, Spring, Summer, and Fall with one special issue each May by
Washington University, St. Louis, Mo.
DEBORAH I. CONRAD
ELLEN SCHIFF COOPER
Articles Editors
MARY CATHERINE LAFOND
ROBERT D. NIENHUIS
EDITORIAL BOARD
JAMES V. STEPLETON
Editor in Chief
LEE ANN WATSON
Managing Editor
RIcHAu A. KAuFMAN
Special Project Editor
STEVEN W. EDWARDS
Chief Notes & Comments Editor
LIONEL H. PEABODY JOHN C. PETERSON
Notes & Comments Editors CHARLoTrE A. TILEsToN
PAUL L BINDLER
ToDo MAXWELL HENS
RICHARD A. MUELLER
RicIHAI A. ABRAMs
HOWARD KErrH ADELi
THOMAS B. ALLEMAN
MARK G. ARNOLD
BRUCE C. BAILEY
DONALD M. BARON
RICHARD G. BARRIER
KENNETH W. BEAN
RICHARD BIERMAN
MARK ALAN BLACK
PAUL F. BLACK
SUSAN L CHAPMAN
CHARL= C. ALLEN I
FEANK P. AsCHEnMEY
G. A. Bun . JR
DANNY M. BumcHmR
RxxpoRO H. CA utHW s
MICHaL K. COlLINS
DAVE L. CoRNIEL
DAVD W. DTaJE
WAT E. Dros, JR.
SAX EX:Z s
GLEN A. ftAHmTux
J. CHrITENDEN SHAPLEIGH JOAN
,RAW MICHAEL C. SHINDLER MEIR
ALEX P. TRosroRFF CARO
Editors
STAFT
ROBERT ANGELO CREO SHEL
,MAN CYNTHIA MARIE ECKELKAMP ERIc
MICHAEL STEVEN FRIED KEVI
JANE A. GEBHART FLOI
BRENT W. HATHHORN DAvi
HARRY STEWART KARPEN RICH
WILLIAm V. KILLORAN, JR. GEN]
JONATHAN KmRAscH STEV
STEVEN L. LARSON RoBE
Domis C. LINDBERGH BRUC
L. RUSSELL MITTEN MICI
JOHN DENNIS MOORE
BUSINESS MANAGER: JOAN D. VAN PELT
SECRETARY: SYLVIA H. SACHS
ADVISORY BOARD
ROBERT A. FINES FRw L. KUHLMANN
ARTHUR J. FREUND PAUL M. LAURENZA
FRANCIS M. GAFqrY WARREN R. MAICHEL
JuLs B. GmRAR JAMES A. McCORD
JOSEPH J. GRAVELY DAVID L. MILLAR
DONALD L. GUNNELS GRECO R. NARsBs
MICHAEL HOLTZMAN DAVID W. OERSTING
GEoRGE A. JENSEN NORMAN C. PARKER
LLOYD R. KoENi CHRISTIAN B. PETER
ALAN C. KOHN ALAN E. PoPKIN
HARRY W. KROUEO ROBERT L. PROOST
D. VAN PELT
J. WESTREICH
'LYN G. WOLFF
DON NOVICK
S. PALLES
JN . PRENDERGAST
D DAVID REED
O A. ROBINSON
ARD A. ROTnMAN
E W. SPrI MILLER
M. SUMBERG
ORT S. TANDLER
in L. WEINER
IAEL E. WILSON
ORVILLE RICHARDSON
W. MUNRO ROBERTS
STANLEY M. ROSENBLUM
A. E. S. SCHMID
EDWIN M. SHAEFFER, JR.
KARL P. SPENCER
JAMES W. STARNES
MAURICE L. STWARET
DoMeIC TROIANI
ROBERT M. WASHBURN
WAYNB B. WRIGHT
1009
Washington University Open Scholarship
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1975/iss4/3
